“The international community cannot turn a blind eye on what is happening in Darfur and allow another genocide to happen in this region.” With this startling admission of failure ends a statement by the European External Action Service from November 12 of this year.
During the preceding three days, more than 800 people were killed in an attack on the town of Ardamata in West Darfur. At least 8,000 others fled to neighboring Chad as paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and affiliated Arab militias systematically rounded up, shot or sexually assaulted members of the non-Arab Masalit ethnic group.
Sudan has been engulfed in civil war since April and already experienced a gruesome wave of massacres in June, but the latest atrocity may be the single largest act of violence thus far.
The European Union, among other international organizations, has dutifully and repeatedly affirmed its commitment to human rights while condemning the campaign to drive the Masalit from their land. But nothing being said or done up to now has prevented more bloodshed.
Likewise, neither European news media nor the general public appear to be particularly moved by this topic – in stark contrast to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 or the current war between Israel and Hamas. If the events in Darfur are indeed another genocide in the making, what explains our reluctance to engage?
In 2002, Samantha Power, currently the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), published “A Problem from Hell”. Her seminal work on the history of genocide describes how the United States used an argumentative trifecta of futility, perversity, and jeopardy to repeatedly justify its non-intervention in mass killings throughout the 20th century.
Tragically, this pattern applies to the current European political context as well, but looking closely at each element of this rationalisation will illustrate that our inaction has tremendous costs for both the Sudanese people and Europe’s credibility.
Futility refers to a problem that is described as impossible to resolve, perhaps because it may be logistically not feasible to intervene in time. Any response (whether military or diplomatic) is usually believed to be ineffective.
Sudan appears to be a paradigmatic case for this argument. Depending on where one starts the chronology, the country has been embroiled in wars before and after it gained independence in 1956.
The 2003 rebellion that sparked almost continuous fighting until today and led to charges of genocide is the most obvious marker for a seemingly intractable conflict. Sudan’s multi-ethnic population with cross-cutting tribal and religious identities adds another layer of complexity that impedes a peaceful resolution.
But several decades of violence and ethno-religious animosity in other parts of the world (particularly the Middle East) have not been an obstacle for Europe’s diplomatic ambitions.
Double standards and selective engagements
Being aware of this double standard caused by selective engagement on human rights would be the first step in improving how the global South, and especially the Sudanese people, perceive European leadership or the lack thereof.
The argument of perversity focuses on the fear of unintended consequences. Any action taken against a potential genocide is imagined as counterproductive because it would only make things worse.
The conflict could escalate through increasingly brutal reprisals or entail other catastrophic consequences. But when looking at Sudan through the lens of these hypotheticals, one is left wondering how much more suffering we are willing to impose on the country. Almost any metric reflects a state of emergency.
Even before the civil war resumed in April, 65% of Sudan’s population lived in poverty. Persistent drought, interspersed with torrential rains and flooding, is contributing to malnutrition. An estimated 70% of hospitals in conflict-affected regions are not operational, and the remaining ones are overwhelmed by people in need of care.
In the last eight months, according to the International Organization for Migration, the number of displaced individuals reached almost 6 million. An additional 1,3 million people fled to neighbouring countries. 31% of the displaced population is younger than 18 years, and about 90% cannot go to school.
The United Nations’ 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan indicates total needs of US$ 2,57 billion, of which almost 62% is unmet. The United States has contributed close to 56% of the current funding – the EU a paltry 12,6%.
In other words, statements of concern or condemnation are cheap, whereas an adequate commitment of resources represents an opportunity for Europe to restore its credibility as a champion of human rights.
Jeopardy as the third and final rationale for inaction suggests that an intervention would entail such political or economic costs (or both) as to endanger our core strategic interests or those of allies.
The Sudanese people deserve our attention
In its own words, the European Union’s foreign and security policy seeks to “preserve peace, strengthen international security, promote international cooperation [and] develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
Two particular risks inherent in the crisis in Sudan lay bare how easily these rather abstract goals could be subverted. First, there are reports that several thousand men who used to work as intelligence operatives under former president Omar al-Bashir and have ties to his Islamist movement are now fighting alongside the army in Sudan’s war. It is not difficult to imagine how much more unlikely a peaceful settlement would be in case of an Islamist resurgence.
The second, related risk involves the Wagner Group, which already wields considerable influence in other countries of the Sahel, as exemplified by the French withdrawal from Mali in August of last year.
Reducing the European footprint in Sudan could create a similarly attractive vacuum for the expansion of Russian influence. Neither of these scenarios bodes well for the maintenance of a universal human rights regime, but they would very effectively expose the discrepancy between rhetoric and reality in Europe’s claim to “be among the keepers of international and humanitarian law,” as Josep Borrell, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, recently put it.
European leaders or civil society at large cannot be allowed to pick and choose where human rights apply.
The Sudanese people are paying with their lives for our decision not to engage more forcefully, whereas the opportunity cost of inaction for us is the steady erosion of credibility as a moral currency.
Unless we are willing to declare that some human beings are worth more than others, the Sudanese people deserve no less of our attention and assistance than what we are willing to provide elsewhere.
