Hungary’s recent parliamentary elections produced a historic outcome for Roma political participation. Five Roma MPs were elected to the National Assembly: four from Tisza and one from Fidesz.
In Hungary, the Roma minority accounts for 8 % of the population. Across Europe, politicians assume Roma either do not vote or vote for whoever holds power. Hungary challenged that assumption. Roma voters punished Fidesz, rejected the far right and helped deliver Tisza a parliamentary majority.
Analysis by the Roma for Democracy Foundation (RDF), covering 149 municipalities and 44 constituencies with significant Roma populations, shows a clear shift. In these constituencies, Fidesz’s vote share fell by an average of 16.8 percentage points, with losses reaching -26.9.
Tisza gained 19.02 percentage points, flipping multiple seats from Fidesz. In one constituency (Borsod 6), Roma voters were decisive: without them, Fidesz would likely have won. Mi Hazánk, Hungary’s far-right party, also declined, including in areas where turnout among Roma increased and economic conditions were most severe.
Although the inclusion of the five Roma MPs is a historic first, representation alone does not resolve structural exclusion. Péter Magyar’s Tisza party has yet to set out a credible agenda on structural reforms, proportional representation, school desegregation, reform of the public works programme, and the reallocation of misused EU funds.
Hungary has already seen what representation without influence looks like. Between 2022 and 2026, Roma MPs sat in parliament as part of the opposition, while the governing majority remained unchanged.
During this period, early school leaving among Roma reached 62.7 percent, compared to 9.9 percent among non-Roma. Court rulings on school segregation were not implemented, and allegations of large-scale misuse of EU funds continued, with limited domestic follow-through. On the Fidesz side, the pattern is different but equally telling.
A leading Roma candidate, a state secretary for Roma relations placed 15th on the party list, has been linked to leaked recordings in which he allegedly promises contracts to party loyalists and uses threatening language. His predecessor made zero parliamentary interventions over eight years. Representation did not translate into institutional change."
School segregation
Segregated schools and poor education remain the most visible structural failure. Around 35 percent of Roma students attend majority-Roma schools, while segregation complaints account for nearly 70 percent of those received by Hungary's ombudsman.
The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly ruled against Hungary on this issue, most recently in Szolcsán v. Hungary (2023), calling for a nationwide desegregation policy. No systemic desegregation has followed.
The Commission launched infringement proceedings in May 2016, but has still not referred Hungary to the European Court of Justice, a step it took against Slovakia in 2023.
Furthermore, around 38 percent of Roma youth are not in employment, education or training (NEET), compared to 9 percent of non-Roma. Employment rates remain significantly lower: 55 percent for Roma men and 36 percent for Roma women.
Earlier this year, a government minister described Roma as a “labour reserve” for manual jobs that no-one else wants to do, prompting protests in Budapest with more than 1,000 demonstrators. The episode illustrates how economic narratives and political messaging intersect to shape perceptions and policies.
Democracy deficit
For Roma voters, the practical choices remains constrained. A Tisza-led government may offer symbolic inclusion without structural change unless it addresses the mechanisms that limit political agency.
One example is Hungary’s system of “minority self-government”, elected bodies meant to represent recognised national minorities, including Roma, at local and national level. These bodies have consultative roles in areas such as education and culture, but limited decision-making power and weak financial autonomy.
While often presented as a model, the system creates a structural trade-off. Roma candidates who run in minority self-government elections are often excluded from party lists in national elections, and vice versa. This limits the ability to build influence simultaneously within minority structures and mainstream political institutions.
Rather than enabling political participation, the system channels representation into a parallel track with limited power. No other electorate is required to trade political influence for cultural representation. 2022 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling stated that it violates the right to free elections and is discriminatory.
How the Tisza party governs, and what the EU accepts here, will set a precedent for the treatment of Roma minorities across Europe, including in Romania and Slovakia. The standard cannot be to document violations for a decade while declining to enforce them.
For Tisza, the demands are clear: enforce the court rulings on school desegregation; dismantle the public works programme that has functioned as a tool of economic and political coercion; reform the minority self-government system; and redirect EU funds toward education, entrepreneurship, and democratic participation and empowerment.
Roma voters did not shift electoral outcomes to replace one system with a more polished version of the same model. The question is now whether Tisza will act on that mandate.
