Hungary’s vote has been cast as a turning point - but the forces behind populism remain intact.
Within two hours of the polls closing, it was evident that Fidesz, Hungary’s governing party, had lost the parliamentary election and Viktor Orbán conceded graciously much to the chagrin of those who had falsely predicted otherwise. Three interrelated factors explain its defeat.
First, Fidesz failed to engage younger generations. By 2024, it had effectively given up on young voters, fatalistically accepting that their support was lost. Second, the party never grasped what drove the hostility of younger voters. That hostility reflected the growing influence of Western identity politics, with its emphasis on individual psychology and identity an outlook that stands in clear tension with Fidesz’s traditional conservative values.
Third, Péter Magyar, leader of the Tisza Party, proved to be an accomplished communicator who personified a widespread demand for change. After 16 years of Fidesz rule, many voters simply felt that enough was enough. Fidesz, by contrast, struggled to respond to this mood.
The reaction across Europe was immediate. Patriotic activists expressed concern that Orbán’s defeat would weaken their own prospects. As one Spanish activist from the populist party Vox told me: “This is not just a setback for you guys in Hungary; it will undermine the confidence of my colleagues in Spain.”
The Hungarian election was arguably the most significant political contest in Europe in recent years. Its importance was recognised on both sides of the Atlantic. On the eve of the vote, the Financial Times noted that “Orbán’s defeat would deprive nationalist conservatives across the world of a champion”. The Guardian similarly described the election as a potential “bellwether event for the global far right” ahead of key political battles elsewhere[ii].
For globalist, anti-conservative elites, defeating the Hungarian government had long been a priority. The EU establishment, in particular, was focused on removing a national conservative regime that frequently obstructed its agenda.
Politico reported that the “Brussels establishment is praying” for the Tisza Party to win. My own discussions with individuals close to the European Commission confirmed the depth of resentment towards Viktor Orbán and the political outlook he represented. For many of them, the victory of Péter Magyar is also their victory.
In the aftermath, a wave of commentary has presented Orbán’s defeat as a turning point. Polly Toynbee argued that it “could represent a turning of the tide”. Others went further. Bloomberg described the result as exposing populism’s “Achilles’ heel, a phrase echoed by the Washington Post.
The New Statesman declared that “Hungary proves populism can be defeated”, while CNN suggested that populism may simply “run out of road”. For The New World, this was nothing less than “the beginning of the end of populism”.
Drivers of populism
Such conclusions are premature. They reflect a persistent misunderstanding of the forces that drive populist politics.
Time and again, commentators have predicted the imminent disappearance of populist movements, only to be proven wrong. The reason is simple: populism is not merely a product of charismatic leaders or political opportunism. It is demand-driven. It expresses the concerns of a significant and growing section of society that feels it lacks a meaningful political voice.
For many voters, issues such as national sovereignty, border control, migration, and cultural continuity are not abstract concerns. They are tied to a deeper desire for stability and continuity in a rapidly changing world. The aspiration to maintain intergenerational continuity and the security of familiar ways of life has deep roots in European societies.
Yet these sentiments are often dismissed by cultural elites, who tend to portray populist movements as artificial or manipulative forces rather than responses to genuine concerns.
Crucially, these underlying values were not decisively rejected in Hungary. The Tisza Party’s victory did not rest on a direct challenge to the core themes associated with Fidesz: national sovereignty, strong borders, opposition to mass migration, and the celebration of tradition. These ideas were not explicitly defeated at the ballot box.
For this reason, Orbán’s loss should be seen as a political setback, not a decisive ideological defeat. Governments can lose power; the social forces that shape political demand are far more resilient.
Developments elsewhere in Europe reinforce this point. The appeal of leaders and movements that articulate concerns about sovereignty, identity, and political accountability remains strong. The electoral landscape continues to reflect a demand for alternatives to the political mainstream.
If there is any doubt that the spirit of populism continues to resonate, the outcome of last Sunday’s election in Bulgaria should put it to rest. Rumen Radev-sometimes described as Bulgaria’s Orbán- secured an absolute majority. As the centrist commentator Dimitar Keranov lamented, “a Kremlin-friendly leader governing a NATO and EU member state on the Black Sea… is bad news for the EU and for Ukraine”.
Orbán’s defeat marks the end of a long political chapter in Hungary. But it does not mark the end of populism in Europe. The demand that fuelled its rise remains firmly in place - and it will continue to shape the continent’s political future.
