Even after four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union remains deeply dependent on Russia for a strategic energy resource: uranium.
The EU imports Russian Uranium products, including raw, processed and enriched uranium and fabricated fuel. In 2024, the EU imported more than €700 million worth of uranium products from Russia. These imports are essential to the operation of nuclear power reactors which generate nearly one quarter of electricity in the European Union.
While this is only a fraction of the €22 billion in total energy imports from the aggressor state, it carries significant strategic weight. This dependency hinders Europe’s efforts to break free from Russian energy and exposes it to political blackmail.
How Dependent is the EU?
Europe relies entirely on imported uranium, with Russia as a key supplier. Russia provides up to 38% of the enriched uranium used in EU nuclear power plants. Another great vulnerability stems from Soviet-designed VVER reactors — 19 of which still operate in the EU. Nearly all their fuel is supplied by Rosatom.
Europe’s reliance on Russian nuclear materials has not only persisted but, in some cases, grown.
In 2023, imports of Russian nuclear fuel to the EU jumped from 314 tonnes to 573 tonnes, aiming to stockpile nuclear fuel for power plants in case of future trade disruptions. These could buffer short-term disruptions, but they are no substitute for new supply chains.
A Strategic and Moral Dilemma
What was once seen as a technical procurement issue has now become a strategic liability, a political contradiction, and a moral concern amid Russia’s ongoing war.
Russia has already demonstrated its willingness to weaponize energy. In 2022, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Europe. The same scenario could repeat in the nuclear sector. If Moscow halts uranium exports — or if the EU finally imposes sanctions — many reactors could face serious disruptions. Existing stockpiles may last only two to three years.
Ongoing uranium imports also reinforce political dependency. Rosatom plays a central role in Hungary’s nuclear expansion, allowing Moscow to undermine EU unity — with Budapest blocking sanctions while strengthening ties with the Russian state-owned company.
But Rosatom is far from an ordinary commercial entity. It is deeply embedded in Russia’s military-industrial complex: collaborating with sanctioned defense firms, contributing to nuclear weapons development, and fulfilling contracts for the Ministry of Defence. Continuing business with Rosatom directly weakens the EU’s sanctions.
Moreover, Rosatom actively exploits legal loopholes and third-country partnerships — bypassing restrictions and enabling the continued flow of funds, technologies, and influence.
Alternatives to Russian Fuel
Rosatom’s subsidiary, TVEL, holds a near-monopoly on fuel for Soviet-designed reactors. However, alternatives are emerging. Westinghouse has already supplied VVER-compatible fuel to Ukraine, Slovakia, Czechia, Bulgaria, and Finland.
In 2023, Framatome announced plans to manufacture VVER fuel assemblies at its Lingen facility in Germany. While promoted as a move toward reducing Russian dependency, the project originally involved a joint venture with TVEL and still operates under a Russian license. Even after Framatome took full control post-invasion, TVEL remained the license holder and technical sub-supplier.
This project shows both the potential for independence and the risk of continued reliance. As long as production relies on Russian intellectual property, Rosatom retains influence — including through board participation and voting rights. A project intended to diversify supply may, paradoxically, entrench dependence.
This Dependency Can Be Broken — But Not Overnight
While companies like Westinghouse and Framatome are advancing alternative fuel supplies, scaling up production will require time, investment, and political commitment.
The EU cannot halt Russian uranium imports overnight—any move to do so could trigger an abrupt halt from Russia. Still, this dependency can be eliminated within five to seven years. The technology and resources to break free are already in place.
The EU needs a bold strategy to expand domestic production and curb Rosatom’s influence.
The first step should be a ban on enriched uranium imports. A phased, legally binding embargo must follow — beginning with enriched uranium and extending to fabricated fuel for VVER reactors. This approach would allow industry to adapt while creating legal pathway for existing contracts with Rosatom.
To support this shift, a legal framework is needed allowing companies to withdraw from long-term agreements, some of which run well into the 2030s. Like the U.S., the EU could grant national security waivers in exceptional cases where Russian imports remain temporarily necessary.
Long-term resilience requires genuine diversification. Natural uranium is abundant, and trusted suppliers — including Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan, and Namibia — are already accessible. On the industrial side, France’s Orano, the UK’s Springfields facility (potentially with Westinghouse investment), and planned enrichment expansions by Urenco and Orano offer credible alternatives.
These projects must be prioritized and fast-tracked with strong EU-level financial and regulatory support.
This op-ed was prepared based on the joint analytical paper 'Ending European Union imports of Russian uranium' by the Kyiv-based DiXi Group and the Brussels-based Bruegel think tanks.
