Almost daily we read news about turning points, historic moments, and decisive crossroads. Yet the most profound transformations often develop quietly, beneath the surface.
This month, Europe’s train seems to be taking a new turn on the tracks of our security and defence, though not without friction.
The political will is finally maturing to strengthen one of the core public duties: security. But good intentions alone will not be enough.
Virtually all European news items this month revolve around defence and support for Ukraine. Changing circumstances demand changing policies.
The United States is pressing European member states to step up their efforts, as Washington signals that it will reduce or even withdraw its own involvement in Europe and Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Russia’s escalating hybrid attacks, from drones to cyberwarfare, show that the Kremlin is not shying away from confrontation, nor is it interested in genuine peace talks.
That means we will have to protect not only Ukraine, but also Europe itself, far more decisively.
Efficiency gains of up to 30%
And yes, there's no such thing as a free lunch. Since Russia’s invasion in 2022, the European Union and its member states have provided €173.5 billion in support to Ukraine, of which €63 billion has been military aid.
According to the IMF, Ukraine will face another funding gap of around €134 billion over the next two years, including for military assistance.
These are staggering numbers, made even more daunting by the inefficiencies that still plague our collective spending.
We still “cook” too little at the European level and fail to make full use of the Ukrainian ingredients already on the table.
Studies show that efficiency gains between 15 and 30 percent could be achieved if we were to coordinate our defence procurement more strategically and collectively at the EU level.
Last year, EU member states together spent a record €346 billion on defence; this year that figure is expected to rise to €380 billion, and soon to €400 billion.
The money is clearly there, the challenge is to spend every euro of taxpayers’ money wisely and efficiently.
Unfortunately, entrenched national interests continue to stand in the way of lasting European cooperation.
France has long shielded its own industry while Germany and Italy remain equally cautious when it comes to their domestic defence sectors.
National defence ministers still want to decide for themselves how to spend their budgets, especially now that those budgets are finally growing.
Various European initiatives are trying to bring down these walls of national reflexes, brick by brick, but despite the urgency, progress remains painfully slow.
A new EU4UA Fund: Three wins in one move
The realisation that supporting Ukraine is our first line of defence has not yet sunk in deeply enough. A paradigm shift is therefore overdue. By partially Europeanising our defence spending, we could strike three targets with one shot.
A new EU4UA Fund should be established, worth €150 billion. One third would go to military procurement in support of the Ukrainian armed forces, preferably through European suppliers.
Another third would be invested in key European defence projects that, in cooperation with Ukraine, would enhance the protection of our own territory and strengthen Europe’s defence industry.
The European Commission’s proposed flagship initiatives, such as joint air-defence systems and anti-drone capabilities, provide an excellent framework.
The final third would sustain Ukraine’s economy, helping to prevent the country from collapsing after years of defending Europe’s security at enormous human and financial cost.
Financing such a mechanism could come from a partial Europeanisation of national defence budgets.
To avoid duplication and inefficiency, 2 percent of the combined EU defence expenditure could be pooled annually, in a way similar to the NextGenerationEU recovery fund.
This would require only a small fraction of each national defence budget, yet have an immediate impact on the ground in Ukraine and within Europe’s defence industry. Over a 25-year period, both capital and interest could be fully repaid.
For member states, this would simply mean reallocating 2 percent of their existing defence budgets, in Belgium’s case, that’s 2 percent of the 2 percent earmarked for defence.
Across the EU, this would generate around €8 billion per year, making it possible to raise €150 billion immediately on the financial markets. The cost?
Roughly €1.50 per European per month, a modest insurance premium for our first line of defence.
Why hesitate?
While Belgium's Defence Minister Theo Francken courts American companies on his U.S. trade mission, his party colleague and Prime Minister of Belgium Bart De Wever rightly argues that Europe’s defence response must, more than ever, be European.
His remarks, and even his call for stronger European powers during the opening lecture at Ghent University, suggest a welcome shift in thinking.
Cuiusvis hominis est errare, nullius nisi insipientis in errore perseverare. It is the nature of every person to error, but only the fool perseveres in error.
Belgian Cicero-loving Prime Minister will be familiar with this line from the Roman 'Philippic Orations'.
So what are we waiting for to continue Europe’s integration in the field of defence?
