When the EU Green Deal materialised in 2021 through the Fit for 55 Package publication, a lot was said about its implications on the European continent, particularly on the EU’s energy security.
A couple of days ago, The Brussels Times published an article about the EU’s current energy mix situation. The article draws on data from the European Commission’s interactive publication ‘Energy in Europe – 2026 edition’, which highlights that renewables represented the largest share in energy production in 2024: “48% of energy produced in the EU in 2024 came from renewables”.
This sounded like a positive message to me, but I was wondering what the rest of the picture was. How much closer are we to the EU Green Deal’s goal of achieving climate-neutrality by 2050? How have Europe’s geopolitical considerations changed in the process of the green energy transition? And where does it all leave us against the ongoing Strait of Hormuz blockade?
Let’s take it from the top: “48% of energy produced in the EU in 2024 came from renewables”. This number shrinks once we look at the EU’s total energy mix (both EU-produced and imported), in which renewables accounted for a less impressive 20%. But is 20% high or low?
To answer that, we can compare it to the EU’s 2021 energy mix (see ‘Shedding light on energy in the EU – 2023 edition’), the year in which the FF55 Package was published. In 2021, the share of renewables in the total mix was 17%.
In simplified terms, we could say that the share of renewables in the EU’s total energy mix went up by 1% each year between 2021-2024. The question, then, is whether this pace is sufficient to hit the 2030 and 2050 energy mix targets set by the European Commission to reach climate neutrality in 2050?
Based on Bruegel/ECFR’s presentation of European Commission projections (2020), in order to reach climate neutrality by 2050, renewables would need to account for approximately 30% of the total energy mix by 2030 and about 70% by 2050, assuming that e-fuels are clean-energy based. Against this benchmark, the yearly 1% increase observed between 2021-2024 is not enough to bridge the gap to 2030.
Lagging renewables: a growing challenge
In other words, we need to significantly accelerate renewable energy uptake. To reach 30% by 2030 and 70% by 2050, the EU would need to roughly double the annual increase in the share of renewables compared to the 2021-2024 period.
Now, let’s have a look at what the current EU’s energy mix tells us about Europe’s energy autonomy and see how this compares to 2021. According to the Commission’s 2026 publication, the EU’s energy import dependency in 2024 was almost 60%.
In 2021, it stood at 56%. This means that, rather than moving toward greater energy self-sufficiency, the EU has actually become slightly more dependent on imported energy.
If we take a more granular view, we see that the largest component of the EU’s energy imports in 2024 was, by far, petroleum - including crude oil (67%), followed by natural gas (24%).
In 2021, the composition was similar: 64% petroleum and 25% gas. To put these numbers into context, it is worth looking at where these imports came from and how the EU’s dependency shifted geographically between 2021 and 2024 - years marked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the EU’s decision to phase out its reliance on Russian oil and gas.
In 2024, the EU’s oil and petroleum products were mainly supplied by the United States (16%), Norway (12%), Kazakhstan (9%), and Saudi Arabia (8%). Natural gas imported into the EU in 2024 came primarily from Norway (30%), followed by the United States (17%), and then Algeria and Russia (both 14%).
In 2021, the picture looked very different. Russia accounted for 28% of the EU’s oil imports, while the US and Norway each supplied 9%, and Libya and Kazakhstan 6% each. For natural gas, Russia was the dominant supplier with 44%, followed by Norway (16%) and Algeria (12%). So, what picture emerges from this comparison?
Between 2021 and 2024, the share of Russian oil imports was largely replaced by supplies from the US (up from 9% to 16%), Norway (from 9% to 12%), Kazakhstan (from 6% to 9%) and Saudi Arabia (8% in 2024). For natural gas, Russia’s share fell sharply from 44% to 14%, while Norway’s increased from 16% to 30%, Algeria’s rose slightly from 12% to 14%, and the US accounted for 17% of EU gas imports in 2024.
To verbalise the numbers, the US, Saudi Arabia, Norway and Kazakhstan have been the main beneficiaries of the EU’s decision to move away from Russian oil and gas.
With the US leading the group, the EU’s growing dependency on American energy supplies (although still moderate compared to Russia’s former dominance) is a paradoxical development at a time when EU-US relations are facing their “lowest moment” since NATO came into existence, as the former European Commission President José Manuel Barroso noted in the aftermath of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in January 2026.
Europe’s energy vulnerability
Finally, what do we make out of all this information in the context of the ongoing Strait of Hormuz crisis? Let me return to the opening statement that “48% of energy produced in the EU in 2024 came from renewables”. Yes, but when we look at the total energy mix, the EU’s dependence on oil (both EU-produced and imported) has not decreased. In fact, it increased from 34% in 2021 to 38% in 2024.
We know that roughly 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it critical for global energy security. Even if Europe physically imports only limited volumes of Gulf oil and LNG directly, it is not insulated from global price shocks.
As the Brussels-based economic think tank Bruegel explains: “Europe’s most pronounced vulnerability is LNG. If LNG flows via the Strait of Hormuz are curtailed, global spot availability tightens immediately. Europe would then be forced to compete with Asian buyers for flexible cargoes on the spot market.”
In the same analysis, Bruegel also warns that higher oil and gas prices could trigger renewed coal demand. Such development would take Europe backwards on its green energy transition trajectory.
To conclude, three trends stand out. First, the roll-out of renewable energy in the EU lags behind the ambition of the EU Green Deal. Second, the EU’s dependency on US oil and gas has increased despite the deepening rupture in transatlantic relations. And third, the Strait of Hormuz exposes how vulnerable Europe’s energy system remains to the point that external shocks continue to pose a risk to the ‘safety’ of the EU’s renewable-energy targets.
