More than three decades after Maastricht, the EU is still struggling with the same fundamental question: who actually speaks for Europe on foreign policy?

As discussions about a possible negotiated end to Russia's war against Ukraine intensify, the question of who exactly would represent Europe at the peace negotiating table, in particular, but also the bigger one of who speaks for Europe on foreign policy, has not been answered.

The US has expressed support for European participation in the peace process. Moscow has reportedly told Brussels to choose an envoy if it wants a seat. However, the Kremlin has denied agreeing to European participation in the negotiations, which means that Europe's seat at the table is far from being guaranteed.

In any case, last Friday, 13 November, at the informal European Council meeting in Dublin, António Costa presented Europe's choice. Not a single envoy, but five national leaders and the Presidents of two EU institutions: E5+EU2. The format includes Germany, France, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom, and the European Commission and the European Council. Their national security advisers and institutional representatives will be negotiating on behalf of Europe, at least for now.

Someone are or might already be asking: why seven? Why not nine or twelve? Why no geographically smaller country? Why no candidate country for EU membership? Why is the chief of the European External Action Service excluded? And who knows, the composition of this group may change over time.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys's statement that “Europe cannot speak with 27 microphones” goes without saying, but the E5+EU2 arrangement reduces the number of interlocutors from 27 to seven, which does not create one common European voice either.

However, securing a seat at the negotiating table is one thing; having the political weight and a clear mandate to influence the outcome is another. The second might prove more difficult than securing the chair itself. The question is therefore not only who will speak for Europe at the negotiating table, but whether Member States are prepared to give that voice the political authority it needs.

Even if national security advisers conduct the negotiations, the fundamental questions remain: Who defines Europe's position? Who can make concessions? Who has the authority to commit Europe politically?

Europe still doesn't know how this E5+EU2 team will negotiate with Ukraine, the US and Russia in practice.

Seven representatives, but whose mandate?

Another challenge would be how to get all 27 EU Member States to agree on the negotiating positions of this E5+EU2 team, and to do so quickly. Foreign ministers discussed the composition and mandate of the team on Monday in Brussels, but they do not seem to be ready to give that format the political authority it needs. They want to participate in defining Europe's position, not merely to be informed about negotiations after decisions have been made.

After Dublin, it seems more difficult to prevent the EU's internal disagreements and competition to show political muscle from becoming public. While Kallas is defending and trying to reclaim her institutional role, invoking the treaties, certain foreign ministers themselves are questioning the Dublin arrangement. These exposed tensions between Kallas, the European Commission and national governments risk weakening the EU's credibility before negotiations involving Europe have even started.

Reaching consensus on one person has apparently proved too difficult. The choice of seven leaders instead of one risks reinforcing the perception that the EU cannot agree on a single chief negotiator. A single envoy would not have excluded other European leaders and institutions from shaping Europe's negotiating position. On the contrary, the envoy would have needed their political backing.

At the end of the day, he or she would have acted as a spokesperson, communicating what they had all decided together, while having the authority to negotiate within an agreed mandate. The choice could then have focused on someone broadly respected, or at least taken seriously, not only by Europeans but also by the other parties involved in the negotiations.

Of course, a single envoy would not automatically guarantee a single European position either. Without a common mandate and political backing from Member States, even one representative would struggle to speak with one voice.

The EU's most obvious choice would have been its own foreign affairs chief, Kaja Kallas, and she rightfully invoked her institutional mandate. Yet she was not chosen as the single European envoy by the national leaders who decided on another arrangement, exercising political control themselves. And this shows everyone the limits of that mandate. This hardly came as a surprise to anyone. Some attribute the decision to personality issues, but if that is true, others ask why EU Member States repeatedly appoint people to this position whom they subsequently consider unsuitable for the task.

A European voice constrained by national politics

The exclusion of Kallas is a symptom, not the cause, of the EU's difficulties in developing a common foreign policy. Having a different person as HR/VP would not have made much difference because the question is not whether Kallas is the right fit, but whether national leaders are willing to allow anyone to represent them collectively. Thus, the underlying problem lies with the Member States themselves. The Dublin decision illustrates the persistent tension between national political leadership and the ambition for a common EU foreign policy.

After Dublin, we saw that national leaders will remain in control. And the unwritten rule among Member States that whoever holds the position should not overshadow national political leaders will remain valid. As long as competing national political interests and egos prevail over a shared European vision and common EU interests, any High Representative will struggle to speak on behalf of the EU.

But the roots of this problem run even deeper and far beyond Kaja Kallas and her exclusion from the negotiating team. National political leaders remain accountable primarily to their national electorates. Their political legitimacy and political interests remain largely national. Even when they agree on common European objectives, they are reluctant to give an EU-level representative the political authority to act on their behalf.

Europeans still lack a sense of European identity, a feeling of belonging to something bigger than their individual nation-states. National and European identities can coexist, but the European one is still not developed enough to support common political action when national interests are at stake. The real issue is the missing shared European political identity, which becomes much more visible in times of crisis and when crucial decisions must be taken, like, for example, on who should exercise political authority over EU foreign policy.

Could the E5+EU2 team avoid further cacophony, and would it be able to speak with one voice and communicate its positions clearly? The negotiations on Ukraine will test not only this new format, but also the willingness of Member States to act together on foreign policy.