This autumn, a debate in the EU Council has become a defining test of Europe’s identity. At stake is not just how to support Ukraine, but whether the EU remains faithful to the rule of law, the very foundation of its integration project.
The current controversy involves a bold proposal to back a €140 billion 'reparations loan' to Ukraine using Russia’s immobilised central bank assets, most of which are held at Euroclear, in Brussels.
Championed by several member states, the scheme avoids outright confiscation but effectively deploys the frozen reserves as collateral to mobilise long-term financing for Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction.
Belgium is not convinced. Prime Minister Bart De Wever has called the proposal legally unsound, warning it could violate the legal immunities central bank assets traditionally enjoy under international law and undermine the EU’s financial credibility.
“If it looks like confiscation, and smells like confiscation, and talks like confiscation - maybe you could call it a sort of confiscation,” he said bluntly. “Even during the Second World War, this did not happen.”
Belgium’s position is clear: use the windfall profits generated by the frozen Russian assets - already approved by the EU in 2024 - but leave the principal untouched, unless there is an indisputable legal basis and shared EU responsibility for the risks involved. Far from playing spoiler, Belgium is defending something deeper: the EU’s legal integrity.
Belgium’s move highlights a broader shifting trend as the rapid and urgent measures implemented in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion now appear to be catching up in the form of lawfare and legal challenges.
Another example of such legal discipline was seen in Luxembourg last month, when European Court of Justice Advocate General Andrea Biondi recommended dismissing Latvia’s appeal to reinstate sanctions against businessmen Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven. Latvia argued that geopolitical context justified the listings. Biondi disagreed: political context cannot replace evidence.
His opinion serves as a reminder that politics and law are different games. Even amid geopolitical confrontation, decisions must be supported by indisputable facts, not assumptions or political goals. Regardless of how inconvenient, the principle of “rule of law over politics” must remain a symbol of institutional maturity.
The General Court had annulled the listings in 2024 due to a lack of substantiated links to the Kremlin’s war machine. Biondi’s view highlights that no matter how urgent or righteous a political cause may be, EU sanctions must rest on verifiable facts. Without that, the legal foundation of EU foreign policy crumbles.
These two debates - Russia’s immobilised assets and the evidentiary bar for sanctions - reflect a deeper question: can political necessity override legal principle? If the EU answers “yes,” it risks entering dangerous territory. The politicisation of sanctions and asset control doesn’t just leave it open to defeats in court - it risks weakening trust in the EU’s judicial system, threatens financial stability, and damages the Union’s credibility as a rules-based actor. Worse, it erodes the moral high ground the EU claims in its external action.
Sanctions must also avoid becoming tools of collective punishment. The Union must reject the logic of collective guilt and target individuals based on demonstrable responsibility, not political symbolism.
What sets the EU apart from other geopolitical powers is precisely this legal foundation. From trade law to human rights, the Union has exercised power through due process and legal predictability. That must not change even in wartime.
De Wevers hesitance or Biondi’s opinion are not a defense of Russia; they are rather a call for self-control and common sense. The Council’s earlier decision to allocate windfall profits from Russian reserves was an example of how to act both legally and effectively.
But leveraging the principal would be a dangerous legal leap. Likewise, the EU should continue targeting Kremlin-linked individuals to stop Russia’s war machine, but only on a solid evidentiary basis. Legal shortcuts may be tempting but tend to backfire with a cost in a Union where courts uphold procedural integrity.
This moment calls for maturity. Short-term political gain must not destroy long-term constitutional principles. If Europe wants to remain a leader in law and morality, it must prove it can act within its own rules - even when that is politically inconvenient.
Ukraine needs and deserves Europe’s full support. But lawful action is not a barrier to effective action - it is the basis for it. As Belgium has shown, creative legal solutions do exist. The challenge is not to bypass the rule of law, but to innovate within it.
Europe’s greatest power has never been coercion, but credibility. The Union’s influence rests on the belief that its laws bind even its own ambitions. And if that belief fades, if law yields to politics, then the European project itself begins to erode.
