From migration and sovereignty to identity and living costs, European elections are increasingly shaped by issues that populist movements have made their own. But Hungary’s recent election result exposes the limits of a politics built on fear and grievance. It suggests that voters may distinguish between legitimate concerns and the fear-based politics used to mobilise them.
This contrast formed the backdrop to a recent Brussels discussion with Frank Furedi, executive director of the MCC think tank, sociology professor and author of In Defence of Populism (Polity, 2026). His book argues that populism reflects a demand for voice, belonging and democratic recognition among voters who feel ignored by mainstream politics.
In a conversation with Matthew Karnitschnig, Editor-in-Chief of Euractiv, Furedi challenged what he describes as a persistent “anti-populist propaganda war”. Yet the discussion also pointed to a more difficult issue: whether populism genuinely expands democratic participation, or whether it reduces politics to a struggle between “the people” and those cast as their enemies.
That question goes to the heart of how populism is understood. Furedi questions the common definition of populism and its negative connotations. In general, populism is defined as a political approach that divides society into two antagonistic groups: “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite.”
However, this polarisation is often taken advantage of by an authoritarian leader or “demagogue”. The leader (usually he is a man) uses inflammatory and manipulative rhetoric and claims that he represents the will of the people.
Furedi avoids such connotations. “Populism represents a disposition towards public life, which varies in different national contexts and circumstances,” he told The Brussels Times.
“Currently populism represents a quest for a voice and belonging by people who are concerned with defending a way of life which is at risk of being undermined by an elite whose outlook is antithetical to theirs. It represents an egalitarian impulse against oligarchical tendencies based on the defensive of a democratic common sense. Populism is essentially defensive – a response to a sense of cultural loss.”
But this defence of populism becomes more difficult when it moves from democratic voice to questions of exclusion, identity and who is considered part of the political community.
More contentiously, he argues that people should be able to make distinctions between those who belong to their immediate community and those who do not, even when they are citizens of the same country.
“The word discrimination has had a positive connotation,” he countered. “In its original and strictly objective sense, to ‘discriminate’ means to recognise a difference, distinguish between items, or show good judgment.”
Pressed on whether such distinctions can sit comfortably with equal citizenship, he added that people can have multiple identities. “Whether it is your community, religion or nation or something else that provides the medium for identity formation depends on your particular circumstances and subjective inclinations.”
‘The double betrayal’
“While it is legitimate to discriminate in the pre-political sphere it is not in public life,” he admitted. “In the political sphere everyone is held to the same standard.” A central thesis in his book is the concept of the 'double betrayal’. Asked to explain it in simple words, he replied that it refers to two parallel developments in society.
In his account, it first refers to the detachment of ruling elites from the cultural norms and value system into which they and their ancestors were socialised. Their cultural turn-away from pre-existing dominant norms and values was experienced by a significant section of society as a form of cultural loss.
Second, he argues, it refers to the political Left’s abandonment of its ideological assumptions and its drift towards middle-class cultural and environmental politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The reorientation of their focus on socialism or communism meant that they became less and less interested in continuing their role as the representatives of the interests of working people.
“With the shift of the old left towards Green and Identity politics, working people were left without representation. Betrayed by both the ruling elite and the Left, millions began to look for alternative sources of support – ones that could help them find their voice. The long-term consequence of this development is what I characterise as a popular demand for new alternatives.”
In a recent op-ed in The Brussels Times, Furedi claimed that the rumors of populism’s death after the fall of the Orbán regime in Hungary are greatly exaggerated. Orbán’s loss should be seen as a political setback, not a decisive ideological defeat. He predicts that Orbán’s defeat in the elections will not undermine the populist surge.
“Why? Because the fortunes of populist movements are determined by the national context within which they operate. Populist parties have a strong following in France, Austria, The Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Germany, Britain and Spain. These parties have the potential for forming governments in Austria, Britain and France during the next 2-3 years.”
The response to populism
Furedi’s defence of populism is challenged by critics who see Orbán’s rule as an example of how public anxieties can be turned into fear-based politics.
“The populism that Frank Furedi attributes to Orbán’s regime is accurate insofar as Orbán sought to manipulate natural human fears when the unknown portends to erode our control over everyday life,” commented Marc Loustau, Affiliated Fellow at the Institute for Advance Study, Central European University in Budapest, and author of the "At the Edges” newsletter on Substack.
“But politics should be about more than fear. It should be about hope, promise, and the flourishing of diverse communities,” he added. “European populists like Orbán will fail so long as they cannot provide a substantive and positive image of thriving local communities and national states.”
Was his defeat in the elections a protest against his populist policies? “His defeat was more a rejection of his subservience to Vladimir Putin,” Loustau replied. “Domestically, Orbán reproduced Putin's oligarchic policies, which benefitted his friends and allies. These policies meant that the average Hungarian could not get decent hospital care or their children a good job at home in Hungary.”
Elements of Orbán’s rhetoric about immigration have already shown up in Peter Magyar's post-election statements. “This doesn’t come as a surprise. Magyar promised to keep Orbán’s policies that a majority of people liked. However, fear-mongering populism is certainly dead in Hungary and is likely to disappear throughout Europe.”
In a recent interview in the New York Times, Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari makes as strong case for liberalism and cooperation within societies and among nations. Known for his mega-best-selling- books about the history of mankind, he rejects narrow nationalism and argues for liberalism against populism. “The basic story is about shared experiences and interests and cooperation.”
“Liberalism came and said that history does not have to be about conflict at all, not conflict between nations and not conflict between classes. It can be about cooperation. Why? Because all humans, no matter which race or nation or class they belong to, are essentially the same. Nationalism can exist without hating outsiders. It cannot exist without love for insiders.
“Nationalism, at its core, is about loving and caring about a large number of strangers whom you do not know personally, but you’re nevertheless willing to make a lot of sacrifices for them. The nation is not a family. The nation is not even a small tribe. In a small tribe, you know everybody. It’s based on personal relationships.”
